Sudan – Underground History

Sudan Conflict

Atrocities, Systemic Collapse, and Accountability

AI AUDIO OVERVIEW

I. Executive Summary: The Anatomy of a Catastrophe (SAF-RSF Conflict)

Sudan is currently grappling with one of the most severe humanitarian and human rights crises globally, a direct consequence of the war that erupted on April 15, 2023, between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), commanded by Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo. This conflict is not merely a conventional war; it represents a structural failure rooted in the institutionalization of paramilitary violence, leveraging historical ethnic animosities for territorial control and resource acquisition. The resulting destruction has pushed Sudan to the brink of state failure.

The confluence of political ambition, institutionalized violence, and denial of humanitarian access has generated the world’s largest displacement crisis, with over 12 million people forced from their homes. Crucially, analysis of wartime mortality suggests that the majority of the death toll stems from indirect causes—specifically preventable disease and starvation—rather than direct combat. This signifies a systemic collapse where the breakdown of essential infrastructure is used as a weapon of war. At the human rights level, the crisis is marked by atrocities, including confirmed genocide by the RSF and allied militias in Darfur against the Massalit and other non-Arab populations, widespread sexual violence used systematically as a weapon of war, and large-scale war crimes committed by both warring parties. Meanwhile, geopolitical interference continues to fuel the violence, undermining international mediation efforts and ensuring the conflict remains protracted. This report synthesizes empirical data on mortality, displacement, and food insecurity with detailed analysis of atrocity crimes and geopolitical failures to provide a comprehensive assessment for strategic policy intervention.

II. Conflict Genesis and the Weaponization of Institutional Failure

A. The Roots of the Power Struggle and Military Rivalry

The current conflict originated not from a sudden clash, but from a calculated political rupture following the downfall of Omar al-Bashir’s regime in 2019. The subsequent coup that year was carried out jointly by the SAF and the RSF, establishing General al-Burhan and General Hemedti as co-leaders of a transitional government. This alliance, however, masked fundamental disagreements over political and military authority.

The transitional agreement elevated Hemedti to a position of military equality with al-Burhan and included a mandate for the eventual integration of the RSF into Sudan’s legitimate armed forces under civilian leadership. This condition was a necessary, yet deeply contentious, requirement for transitioning to democratic rule. The failure to specify a deadline for the RSF’s integration created persistent tension, culminating in the parties missing an early 2023 deadline to determine the conditions for implementation. The SAF viewed the integration as necessary to solidify its centralized authority, while the RSF, buoyed by its independence and powerful economic interests (notably gold mines), resisted any measure that would subordinate Hemedti to al-Burhan. This institutional disagreement over security sector reform (SSR) served as the primary trigger for the nationwide hostilities that commenced in April 2023.

The conflict has since moved beyond a mere internal power struggle, evidenced by the RSF’s announcement of a parallel Government of Peace and Unity in July 2025. This move, which includes naming a rival president and prime minister and establishing two rival governors in regions like Darfur, solidifies fears of a lasting territorial split in the country. The escalation demonstrates that the SAF-RSF war is rooted in a fundamental structural failure of the post-Bashir transition, specifically the inability to demobilize or integrate a potent, ethnically motivated paramilitary force. The structure that allowed this dual military power to exist, coupled with the refusal to accept subordination, guaranteed that the resulting violence would be both widespread and focused on seizing permanent territorial control.

B. The Legacy of the Janjaweed: Institutionalized Atrocity

The operational nature of the RSF is intrinsically linked to its antecedent, the Janjaweed militia. The RSF was officially formed in 2013 by then-President Bashir, restructuring and formalizing some elements of the Janjaweed, an Arab militia notorious for counterinsurgency in Darfur. The Janjaweed itself originated from the Sudanese government’s policy of arming Arabic-speaking Abbala nomads to act as an armed deterrent, exploiting existing conflicts over grazing land and water between pastoralists and sedentary agriculturalist populations.

By formalizing this Arab-majority armed group, Bashir granted them state authority while maintaining their operational autonomy, thereby institutionalizing a mechanism of ethnic violence. The group committed brutal attacks and crimes across the Darfur region during the initial conflict, including mass displacement, sexual violence, and kidnapping, which claimed over two hundred thousand lives in the first two years alone. Hemedti, who leads the RSF, also led the broader Janjaweed coalition. The RSF’s established ideology, which includes Arab supremacy and tribalism , directly links its historical methods to the current atrocities being committed across Sudan. The institutional failure of the security sector reform meant Sudan carried forward a militia with a proven record of ethnic cleansing into its political structure. Consequently, the Janjaweed legacy is not just historical context, but the established operational blueprint—now state-sanctioned—for the current campaign of violence and targeted massacres in Darfur.

III. The Human Cost: Mortality, Displacement, and Systemic Collapse

A. Quantifying the Catastrophe: The Invisible Death Toll

The true scale of death in the Sudan conflict is profoundly obscured by systematic underreporting, confirming the difficulty of documentation in a high-intensity, denied-access environment. ACLED records show over 28,700 reported fatalities by the end of November 2024, including over 7,500 civilians killed in direct attacks. However, experts widely consider this figure a severe underestimate, with estimates cited by former US envoys suggesting the actual death toll could be as high as 150,000 people since the conflict began.

The most revealing data comes from the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine (LSHTM), which employed sophisticated capture-recapture analysis, comparing data from multiple independent sources, to estimate wartime mortality. This methodology determined that over 61,000 people died from all causes in Khartoum State alone between April 2023 and June 2024, representing a 50% increase in the pre-war death rate. This estimate significantly exceeds the total number of violent deaths recorded by organizations like ACLED for the entire country over the same period, underscoring that over 90% of both all-cause and violent deaths in Khartoum State have gone unrecorded.

Crucially, the analysis revealed that across most of Sudan, the leading cause of death was preventable disease and starvation, not direct violence. While violence was proportionally highest in Kordofan (80%) and Darfur (69%), the vast majority of total mortality is attributable to the collapse of state services and humanitarian systems. This confirms that the majority of deaths are a result of systemic collapse used as a mechanism of strategic warfare. The high rate of civilian casualties per incident—an average of 20.1 civilian casualties per explosive event in 2024, making Sudan the most lethal conflict zone per incident—further illustrates the indiscriminate nature of the violence.

B. The World’s Largest Displacement Crisis

The violence has triggered the world’s largest displacement crisis, fundamentally altering the demographic landscape of Sudan and destabilizing neighboring regions. Since April 15, 2023, over 7.1 million people have been internally displaced (IDPs), compounding the existing population of 3.8 million people displaced before the current war, resulting in more than 12 million people forced from their homes.

Additionally, over 2.1 million people have fled Sudan across international borders. These refugees have strained fragile neighboring states, including Chad, which hosts approximately 878,002 Sudanese refugees, and Egypt, which hosts an estimated 1.3 million.

The staggering statistics on mortality and displacement demand immediate attention:

Sudan Conflict Displacement and Mortality Metrics

Metric

Figure

Notes

Total People in Need of Humanitarian Assistance

>24.8 million

Over half of Sudan’s population

Total Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

7.1 million (since April 2023)

World’s largest internal displacement crisis

Estimated Total Sudanese Refugees/Asylum Seekers

3.4 million (across borders)

75% are women and children

Estimated All-Cause Deaths (Khartoum State only, Apr 2023–Jun 2024)

>61,000

LSHTM capture-recapture analysis

Proportion of Deaths Caused by Disease/Starvation

Leading cause in most regions

Signifies systemic collapse

C. Collapse of Vital Infrastructure

The devastation extends to the nation’s core infrastructure, deliberately targeted by both warring factions, maximizing civilian suffering. The healthcare system, which previously provided specialized referral care for the entire country from Khartoum , has suffered catastrophic losses. Between April 2023 and August 2024, 41 out of 87 hospitals in Khartoum sustained visible damage, including 17 of the 25 teaching hospitals, hindering both current care and the training of future medical staff. Reports indicate that approximately 70% of Sudan’s health facilities are nonfunctional nationwide, with critical supplies running low. The RSF alone attacked more than 40 hospitals, looting medicine, generators, and ambulances.

The disruption of essential services severely compromises public health. This decline has exacerbated existing health challenges, transitioning the country into a “quadruple burden of diseases” including communicable diseases, non-communicable diseases, physical injuries, and trauma. Furthermore, more than half of health and nutrition facilities lack basic water and sanitation services (WASH). The absence of safe water sources and unimproved sanitation systems, compounded by rampant open defecation in displacement settings, has created conditions ripe for cholera and Acute Watery Diarrhea (AWD) outbreaks. The extensive damage to infrastructure, combined with the collapse of public health systems, confirms a strategy of maximizing indirect mortality, designed to cause long-term population displacement and prevent civilian return.

IV. Atrocity Crimes: Ethnic Cleansing, Sexual Violence, and War Crimes

The conflict is characterized by widespread and systematic human rights violations, often reaching the level of atrocity crimes, with specific ethnic groups being deliberately targeted.

A. Ethnic Cleansing and Massacres in West Darfur

The war in Darfur, a historical flashpoint, has re-emerged with genocidal intensity. The RSF and allied Arab militias committed crimes against humanity and widespread war crimes as part of a systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing against the ethnic Massalit and other non-Arab communities in and around El Geneina, the capital of West Darfur. The targeting of non-Arab communities with the apparent objective of ensuring their permanent removal from the region meets the criteria for ethnic cleansing.

The violence in El Geneina, which peaked in mid-June 2023, killed at least thousands, with a UN panel of experts estimating that between 10,000 and 15,000 people were killed in the city during 2023. Survivors reported systematic targeting; militiamen reportedly asked captives their tribe, executing those who identified as Massalit immediately. Attacks included massacres of civilians attempting to flee in convoys and the systematic targeting of majority-Massalit neighborhoods and IDP camps. The documented acts, including murder, torture, and forcible transfer, constitute the crimes against humanity of murder, torture, forcible transfer of the civilian population, and persecution based on ethnic identity. The severity of these actions led the United States to determine in January 2025 that the RSF and its allied militias committed genocide.

B. The Systematic Weaponization of Sexual Violence (SGBV)

Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) is systematically used as a weapon of war in Sudan. Independent human rights experts have condemned the widespread and systematic violations against women and girls, including killings, abductions, and conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV), overwhelmingly attributed to the RSF.

The UN Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) has documented large-scale sexual violence, including gang-rapes and the abducting and detaining of victims in conditions that amount to sexual slavery in areas under RSF control. This brutal campaign, targeting women and girls in displacement camps across Al Gezira, Sinnar, Darfur, and South Kordofan, includes reports of women being raped in front of relatives. The profound psychological toll is evidenced by reports of survivors increasingly contemplating or committing suicide as a means of escaping the ongoing horrors, highlighting a severe mental health crisis coupled with a total collapse of support systems and pervasive impunity. Since 2025, at least 330 cases of conflict-related sexual violence have been documented.

C. War Crimes Committed by Both Factions

While the RSF is responsible for the documented ethnic cleansing and genocide in Darfur, the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan has found that both the SAF and the RSF are deliberately targeting the civilian population, committing atrocities, including war crimes, on a large scale.

The Sudanese army (SAF) is responsible for indiscriminate aerial bombardments. Reports indicate the SAF committed widespread extrajudicial and summary executions targeting civilians in southern and eastern Khartoum following the recapture of the city. Furthermore, SAF-aligned forces, such as the Sudan Shield commanders, have been accused of gruesome killings and atrocities against civilians. The SAF-affiliated Military Intelligence has also engaged in arbitrary detention and mass arrests of human rights and peace activists critical of the army. Both factions have deliberately targeted civilian property, including schools and healthcare facilities. The conflict thus features both a geographically focused ethno-genocidal element led by the RSF and a nationalized war-crime element stemming from the brutal tactics employed by the conventional SAF in its fight to regain territory, demonstrating pervasive institutionalized impunity on both sides.

V. Catastrophic Hunger and the Famine Threshold

A. IPC Classification and the Scale of Hunger

Sudan faces the worst levels of acute food insecurity ever recorded by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), with projections pointing toward a widening famine. Over half of Sudan’s population, or 25.6 million people, is facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above), coinciding with the lean season between June and September 2024. This figure includes approximately 8.1 million people in Emergency conditions (IPC Phase 4).

The crisis has already crossed the famine threshold (IPC Phase 5, Catastrophe) in several highly vulnerable, conflict-ridden areas. Famine conditions were first confirmed in the Zamzam IDP camp in August 2024 and have since spread to other areas in North Darfur (including Abu Shouk and Al Salam camps) and the Western Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan state. As of late 2024, at least 638,000 people were classified in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5)—the highest number anywhere in the world—with famine projected in five additional North Darfur areas between December 2024 and May 2025. The high rate of acute malnutrition among children, exceeding the 20% threshold for famine confirmation, adds urgency to the catastrophe.

The classification of Famine during the harvest season fundamentally proves that the hunger crisis is not merely an outcome of displacement but a direct, man-made consequence of strategic warfare utilizing starvation tactics.

B. Drivers: Conflict-Induced Agricultural and Economic Collapse

The catastrophic hunger is fueled by direct conflict consequences: disruption of agricultural production and severe economic shocks.

The agricultural sector, upon which two-thirds of the population depend, has suffered catastrophic losses. Two consecutive farming seasons have been under-utilized due to insecurity, the displacement of farmers, the destruction of farmland, and the looting of essential agricultural equipment. This breakdown creates a vicious cycle of agricultural collapse, escalating violence due to competition over scarce resources, and spreading famine.

Concurrently, economic shocks have intensified the crisis. The conflict has destroyed infrastructure, trade routes, and supply chains, leading to a contracting economy and soaring inflation. Market disruptions, particularly in key trade hubs, have worsened food shortages and price hikes, with staple commodity prices tripling in some areas compared to the five-year average. The internally displaced and refugees, having lost their livelihoods, are entirely dependent on humanitarian assistance. The intentional siege of areas like El Fasher by the RSF , combined with the systematic destruction of the agricultural backbone, ensures that food deprivation remains a deliberate operational choice, accelerating the mortality rate.

VI. The Displacement Crisis: Regional Strain and Protection Gaps

The displacement crisis is not confined to Sudan’s borders; it actively destabilizes neighboring states by creating critical resource bottlenecks and exacerbating pre-existing vulnerabilities. Over 2.1 million people have fled to already fragile countries.

A. Strain on Neighboring States and Reverse Flows

The influx has severely strained the capacity of neighboring hosts. Chad hosts 1.2 million Sudanese refugees, overwhelming its resources given that 42% of its population lives below the poverty line.

The situation in South Sudan is particularly complex, involving hundreds of thousands of South Sudanese nationals who are now returning home after having fled civil war or sought economic opportunities in Sudan. Renk, a major transit hub on the White Nile, has become a humanitarian bottleneck. Due to recent aid suspensions and severe funding gaps, the transit center holds three times its intended capacity. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) noted that these funding shortfalls, combined with delays in transporting returnees and refugees onward, increases vulnerability and puts lives at risk.

B. Protection Gaps and Legal Vulnerability

The high proportion of refugees who are women and children (75%) are highly susceptible to SGBV, trafficking, and exploitation. Protection gaps are compounded by regulatory changes in host states. Egypt, which hosts the largest estimated number of Sudanese refugees (1.3 million), adopted a new Asylum Law in December 2024. While ostensibly intended to align with international standards, the law contains vague national security provisions and lacks appeal processes, creating a risk of forced deportation and legitimizing arbitrary detentions. This erosion of protection turns desperation into legal vulnerability, potentially forcing asylum seekers to choose between risking detention or returning to conflict zones. The reliance on host countries with already skeletal support systems ensures that the conflict’s negative spillover effects are maximized across the region.

VII. Obstruction of Aid and Geopolitical Fueling of the War

A. Humanitarian Access Denial and Impunity

The humanitarian response is critically hampered by systemic access denial and the targeting of aid operations, which demonstrates that obstruction is a coordinated political strategy.

Access is constrained by persistent conflict, bureaucratic obstacles, and deliberate siege tactics. The siege of El Fasher by the RSF is a critical case, where, despite sustained high-level international engagement, no aid convoy has been permitted entry for months. This intentional denial of food and supplies serves to starve the population and punish communities resisting control.

Furthermore, Sudan is one of the deadliest conflict zones for humanitarian workers. In 2024, 60 aid workers lost their lives in Sudan, contributing significantly to a global surge in aid worker fatalities. Incidents include drone attacks on convoys offloading food (Mellit, North Darfur), armed assaults that killed aid workers (Al-Koma), and the arbitrary arrest, detention, and abuse of local volunteer aid workers in conflict zones like Khartoum. In addition to active violence, the bureaucratic hurdles in Khartoum, requiring aid partners to secure multiple, time-consuming travel and entry permits from federal and state authorities, severely undermine operations and delay life-saving assistance.

B. Mediation Paralysis and Foreign Intervention

International and regional mediation attempts, such as the Jeddah Process (co-hosted by Saudi Arabia and the United States/Switzerland) and initiatives by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), have largely failed to achieve meaningful breakthroughs. The announcement of a parallel RSF government further exacerbated the polarization and diminished the feasibility of a unified, internationally mediated peace. This failure is partly attributed to the lack of a strong mediator capable of exerting effective deterrence and the low prioritization of the Sudan crisis by major international powers.

Compounding the failures of diplomacy is the active, external state interference fueling the war. The conflict has devolved into a proxy battle supported by regional and international actors pursuing geostrategic and economic interests, particularly focused on Sudan’s lucrative gold mines. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a prominent backer of the RSF, providing financial and material support. Conversely, the SAF receives support and weaponry from external powers including Egypt, Iran, and Russia. Russia is strengthening its approach toward the SAF to secure a strategic base on the Red Sea, while Iran has supplied weapons.

This external weapon supply and financial backing transform the humanitarian crisis into a protracted geopolitical conflict. Moreover, attempts at international intervention have been frustrated: the UN Security Council (UNSC) has been paralyzed by geopolitical rivalries, such as Russia’s November 2024 veto of a draft resolution aimed at protecting civilians, based on concerns about undermining Sudan’s sovereignty. This political inertia and active interference ensure the conflict is prolonged, minimizing pressure on the generals to halt the violence.

VIII. Accountability and the Imperative for Justice

The culture of impunity that long plagued Sudan under Bashir, who himself was indicted by the ICC , directly enabled the current generals to escalate violence to genocidal levels. Effective justice mechanisms are essential to breaking this cycle.

A. The Mandate of the International Criminal Court (ICC)

Despite Sudan not being a party to the Rome Statute, the UN Security Council referral in March 2005 granted the International Criminal Court (ICC) jurisdiction over crimes committed in Darfur. The Office of the Prosecutor has intensified its investigation into the situation, particularly focusing on the alleged crimes committed in West Darfur since the start of the 2023 conflict.

The ICC Office confirms it has reasonable grounds to believe that war crimes and crimes against humanity have been, and continue to be, committed. The ongoing investigation is collecting extensive evidence concerning killing, pillaging, attacks against internally displaced persons camps, gender-based crimes, and crimes against children. The fact that current RSF atrocities directly echo the Janjaweed crimes for which Bashir was indicted proves that lack of accountability is a causal factor in subsequent atrocities.

B. The Role of the UN Fact-Finding Mission (FFM)

The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan is playing a critical role in documenting the massive scale of violations. The FFM’s reports document systematic human rights abuses, including large-scale sexual violence and the deliberate targeting of civilians and vital infrastructure by both the SAF and RSF. The findings serve as essential evidence for future judicial proceedings, including those potentially targeting crimes against humanity (persecution and extermination). The FFM’s work is indispensable for building the case against both high-level military and political leaders, regardless of which faction they belong to.

IX. Policy Recommendations and Strategic Intervention

The international response to the Sudan crisis has been insufficient, resulting in a crisis of governance, humanity, and regional stability. To shift the trajectory, policy must move beyond failed track-one mediation to concerted pressure and resource enforcement.

Enforce Immediate, Unhindered Humanitarian Access: The international community must move immediately to enforce Resolution 2730 by demanding safe, predictable, and unhindered humanitarian access, particularly to besieged areas like El Fasher and Kadugli. This demand must be backed by credible, coordinated threats of targeted sanctions against any commander—from either the SAF or the RSF—responsible for obstructing aid delivery, attacking aid workers, or perpetuating bureaucratic warfare. Alternative, safe aid routes must be urgently established to bypass centralized choke points.
Prioritize the Crisis of Indirect Mortality: Given that preventable disease and starvation are the leading causes of death, the international funding appeal (estimated at $4.2 billion for Sudan’s needs, plus $1.8 billion for refugees ) must be met immediately and fully. Operational priority must be placed on restoring critical civilian infrastructure, particularly healthcare, nutrition services, and WASH facilities, to prevent further deaths from the systemic collapse of services. This constitutes a fundamental component of protecting civilians.
Dismantle External Support and the Conflict Economy: Governments must impose severe and unified sanctions on foreign state actors (including the UAE, Russia, and Iran) found to be supplying weapons, financing, or otherwise fueling the conflict. Targeted asset freezes should be applied to individuals and entities facilitating the wartime economy, particularly the unregulated trade in gold and smuggled commodities, thereby reducing the financial incentives for belligerence.
Strengthen and Expedite Accountability Mechanisms: The international community must fully resource and empower the ICC Office of the Prosecutor to accelerate its investigation into current atrocities in Darfur. Maximum diplomatic pressure should be applied on host states to facilitate the arrest and transfer of high-level suspects, ensuring that perpetrators of genocide and crimes against humanity, regardless of their current factional allegiance, face justice. Furthermore, political support should be given to the UN Fact-Finding Mission’s efforts to collect and preserve evidence of war crimes committed by both the SAF and the RSF across Sudan.
Secure Regional Resilience and Refugee Protection: Immediate and predictable funding must be directed to neighboring host states (Chad, South Sudan, Ethiopia) to alleviate the strain on their infrastructure and prevent regional instability. Furthermore, diplomatic pressure must be exerted on host nations like Egypt to uphold international protection standards and prevent policies, such as the new Asylum Law’s vague provisions, from leading to the arbitrary detention and forced deportation of vulnerable Sudanese refugees.